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Abstract 
The literature on civil-military relations universally asserts that air forces play little to 
no role in the prevention or conduct of the coup d’etat. This thesis contests this claim. Air 
forces have an extensive history of involvement in planned and attempted coup d’etats. In 
addition, air forces throughout the developing world are heavily coup-proofed at extreme cost 
in both military effectiveness and financial resources. The second section of this work 
establishes a theoretical framework that suggests a plausible explanation for this oversight in 
the theoretical literature. This gap in the literature is due to the field’s heavy focus on cases of 
successful coups. When the scope is broadened to include coup attempts, the role of the air 
force emerges. This thesis contends that innate technological and human characteristics 
associated with air forces and airpower result in (1) the high capacity to attempt coups, (2) a 
low ability to succeed in coup attempts, and (3) a high propensity to attempt coups regardless 
of the low rate of success. The applicability of this framework is illustrated through three in-
depth case studies of the role of the air force in coup attempts in Morocco, Iraq, and Iran.  
 
  
2 
Literature Review 
The modern sub-field of civil-military relations within the study of government and 
international relations can be traced, in large part, to the theories of Samuel Huntington and 
his seminal work, Soldier and the State.1 Huntington’s work helped define the terms of 
debate in civil-military relations, and this review will begin with an in-depth review of his 
theories on the nature and importance of professionalism in productive civil-military 
relations. It will then provide a partial critique of Huntington’s theories through Roquie’s 
study of Latin American coups. However, there is by no means a consensus within the 
literature as to the importance of professionalism as the main determinant on the nature of 
civil-military relations. Alternative causal variables include political legitimacy2, internal-
external threat3, and the unique nature of various military branches within the armed forces4. 
Each of these alternative variables will be addressed in turn to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the key literature in the field. In whole, this branch in the literature focuses on 
establishing the causal mechanisms behind good and bad civil-military relations.  
In parallel with these disagreements over causality, an extensive literature emerged 
following the work of Luttwak that examined the mechanisms through which coups emerged 
and sought to explain the nature of the worst state of civil-military relations; the coups d’etat. 
Scholars in this vein of literature began to examine the implications of coups and the detailed 
governmental process of coup-proofing. The latest work by Quinlivan5, Biddle and Zirkle6, 
Pilster and Bhomet7 and others examines the costs incurred by states that utilize coup-
proofing mechanisms rather than professionalism to maintain civilian control of the armed 
forces.  
                                                
1 Huntington 1981 
2 Finer 1976 
3 Desch 2001 and Downing 1992 
4 Hintze 1975 
5 Quinlevan 1999 
6 Biddle and Zirkle 2008 
7 Pilster and Bohmelt 2011 
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Finally, this review will discuss the limited available literature, both in the airpower 
and civil-military relations subfields, that is directly applicable to the role of air forces in 
coup d’etat. The civil-military relations literature universally dismisses the ability of the air 
force to carry out, or aid significantly in, the conduct of a coup. Conversely, the airpower 
literature is split on the ability of foreign airpower to significantly aid in the conduct of a 
coup. However, this vein in the literature fails to apply this logic to the role of domestic air 
forces.8 Even portions of the literature that argue that foreign third party forces can provoke a 
coup make no mention of the domestic air forces and their role in a coup d’etat.9 
The first branch in the civil-military relations literature, which focuses on the origins 
of poor civil-military relations arguably began, not with Huntington in the 1950s, but in the 
early 20th century with the work of Otto Hintze. Hintze looked to the type of armed force 
fielded by the state as being an integral variable in determining the nature of its relations with 
the civilian government. His analysis aims to explain both the reasons why poor civil-military 
relations emerge as well as the relative capability of the various armed services to 
successfully carry out a coup d’etat.10 Fundamentally, Hintze postulated that the army, 
militia, and navy are compatible with different forms of government and poor civil-military 
relations emerge when these two variables are in disconnect.11 In his era, large professional 
land armies had an officer corps drawn from the landed gentry and were allied with 
conservative political forces and held hierarchy and order in high regard. Thus, they were of 
little threat to monarchies and like-minded conservative government despite their high 
                                                
8 Fahrenkrug 2006 and Pape 1996 
9 Ibid 
10 It should be noted that Hintze’s analysis is heavily rooted in the makeup of the officer corps in armies at the 
turn of the 20th century. Additionally, nations of his time were fundamentally single branch forces that heavily 
prioritized one branch over the others. States with the capacity to field both a large navy and army were 
historical abnormalities and the armed forces of a state were based primarily upon the strength of one branch. 
Hintze 1975 
11 The lack of an analysis of the role of the air force is due to his work preceding the use of aircraft in armed 
combat. 
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“utility against internal enemies”12.13 Militias are soldiers of the people and are most 
compatible with democratic governments. However, these forces have a moderate utility 
against internal enemies when the majority of the population supports the government in its 
repression. Finally, Navies have an officer corps drawn from the cities and universities of a 
state. They favor progressive and cosmopolitan governments yet have relatively love utility 
against internal enemies. Hintze’s work is consistent with later 20th century works in his 
assertion that coups are fundamentally the purview of a land army. 
Although Hintze’s analysis is deeply rooted in the origins of the officer corps, which 
restricts his direct applicability to modern times, his theory’s focus on the fundamental 
capabilities or “utility” of the various branches armed services renders his work of great 
significance to this work. This aspect, when combined with his analysis of fundamental and 
distinct “natures” held by the various branches, makes Hintze’s framework the bedrock upon 
which much of this work rests.  
Following Hintze’s work, the cold war inspired a number of civil-military relations 
scholars who continued the search for an applicable formula for good civil-military relations. 
In Hintze’s framework, civil-military relations are determined by set variables; namely the 
structure of the civilian government and the orientation of a nation’s military forces. Scholars 
in the cold war era increasingly focused on formulating policy-relevant frameworks 
evaluating civil-military relations.  
One of the preeminent scholars in the cold war era, Samuel Huntington revolutionized 
the field of civil-military relations through his work The Soldier and The State. Huntington 
postulates that the revolution in military affairs at the turn of the 20th century created a true 
                                                
12 Hintze 1975 
13 Although Hintze used utility to solely evaluate the capacity of military force to quell revolutions or coups, his 
theories are directly applicable to the coup plotters themselves. Revolution and counter-revolution are merely 
two sides of the same game once hostilities break out. The notion of studying civil-military relations from the 
side of the coup plotter would not emerge until work by Finer and Luttwak in the latter half of the 20th century.  
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professionalism within the officer corps of modern militaries.14 This concept includes the 
three facets of corporateness, expertise, and responsibility. Rather than just being the gentry 
of a state, officers were now experts in the “management of violence”. They now attend 
officer staff colleges and devote themselves fully to the study and practice of conflict. 
Corporateness is used to describe the new bureaucratic structure of military organizations in 
the 20th century. Yet, these officers are differentiated from the condottieri mercenary armies 
of previous centuries by their responsibility to the state above and beyond financial 
remuneration. This set of professional attributes (corporateness, expertise, and responsibility) 
form Huntington’s concept, the military mind; the concept that the mind of a military officer 
is completely separate and distinct from that of civilian leaders.15 Military skills and 
approaches to problems were seen, for the first time in history, completely separate from 
those held by the leadership of the state. This created a new military sphere separate and 
distinct from the civilian sphere. A truly professional military will gladly limit its role in the 
state to the military sphere and has no desire to interfere with politics or civilian areas of 
governance.16 
Huntington does recognize that militaries, in practice, often interfere in domestic 
politics in areas wholly unrelated to the management of violence. He then postulates that the 
origins of this unprofessionalism lie in the initial interference of civilian authorities in the 
military sphere. Huntington separates the methods through which the civilian government 
maintains control over the military into two distinct methods; subjective and objective 
control. Subjective control inserts civilian interests into the military sphere. Once violated, 
the military sphere then spills over into the civilian sphere and poor civil-military relations 
are inevitable. Objective control, however, is cognizant of the distinct nature of the military 
                                                
14 Huntington 1981 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
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sphere and, while setting the fundamental objectives and political goals, allows the military 
the autonomy to manage its own affairs and operations.  
 In his analysis of Latin American coups in the mid 1900s, Rouquié challenges the 
Huntingtonian hypothesis that objective control will necessarily result in good civil-military 
relations.17 The vital contribution made in this work is the importance of relative 
professionalism between the civilian and military administrations. Huntington’s analysis, and 
its focus on Western European civil-military relations, missed the fairly common occurrence 
of military structures that were more professional than their civilian counterparts. In such a 
situation, the relatively higher proficiency of the armed forces in their duties stands in stark 
contrast to the relative deficiencies of the civilian government. During the Cold War, 
competing foreign benefactors were relatively unconcerned with the operation of the civilian 
government and provided significant quantities of aid to strengthen military institutions, 
bureaucracies, and technical expertise which exacerbated this contrast between civilian and 
military professionalism. Rouquié contends that a professional military will be loath to accept 
even objective control by a relatively inept civilian government and be tempted to seize 
control of the civilian sphere in order to impose order. This examination of the importance of 
relative professionalism makes the implicit assumption that the military acts as an 
independent actor with vested interests within the state.  
Finer, in The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, reverses the 
logic of Huntingtonian civil-military relations and proposes a logical framework in which the 
natural state of civil-military relations is for the armed forces to be in charge of the state.18 In 
fact, he argues that the conception of civilian control over the military is a recent 
development and relies on a certain level of political culture within the state. Once the state 
achieves a high level of political culture, the populous refuses to accept military rule or 
                                                
17 Rouquie 1989 
18 Finer 1976 
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intrusion in the civilian sphere as legitimate. This imposes excessively high costs on the 
military as a price for overt intrusion into civilian governmental affairs and results in more 
covert methods through which the military influences policy in the civilian sphere of 
governance. Ranging from mere influence to blackmail and displacement of a civilian 
regime, Finer challenges Huntingtonian notions of distinct military and civilian spheres and 
instead presents a framework in which militaries always intrude on civilian affairs. The 
constraint on the degree of military interference in government not their professionalism but 
the level of political culture within the state.  
Desch counters Finer’s logic on the role of political culture as the determining factor 
in civil-military relations and postulates that internal/external threat dynamics play a key role 
in determining the nature of civil-military relations within a state.19 His theory contends that 
the military as an externally-focused professional organization operates as such when it is 
given an external threat to defend against. In the absence of a significant external threat to 
unify the military and civilian governments against a common enemy they naturally compete 
for funding and influence at the domestic level. The military’s organizational interests during 
peacetime are fundamentally different than those of the civilian government and competition 
will occur. Either actor, the civilian government or the military, may play up foreign threats 
to unify the government against a foreign enemy.  
Both Desch and Finer take the military’s bureaucratic nature in the Huntingtonian 
framework and view the military independent actor with agency in domestic politics. 
Interestingly enough, neither author disagrees that the military would prefer to be involved 
with issues of its own expertise in the management of violence. However, they are skeptical 
of the ability of this preference to overwhelm organizational interests in times of peace. Finer 
has little trust in the ability of a civilian government without legitimacy and political culture 
                                                
19 Desch 2001 
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to constrain their military forces from interfering in governance to protect their organizational 
interests. Similarly, Desch contends that in the absence of an external threat, internal disputes 
over budget, organizational autonomy, and other matters will set the military in competition 
with the civilian government.  
The theoretical disagreements over the origins of bad civil-military relations, and in 
extreme cases coup d'etats, all fail to provide practicable policy recommendations for states. 
Hintze’s theoretical framework takes the governance structure of states to be a byproduct of 
their type of armed forces (Army, Navy, or Militia) and coups are the result of a government 
that is not compatible with its army. This does little to advise states in the modern era who 
desire to maintain democratic governance as well as maintain a professional land army. 
Likewise, an autocratic or monarchical state is unlikely to give up its naval forces if they are 
strategically necessary for defense. A Huntingtonian prescription to practice objective control 
works in principle when a state has good civil-military relations, yet finds few advocates in 
governments fearful of a coup d’etat. Giving more free reign and lesser political controls over 
military promotions, assignments, and policies in order to, in the future, improve civil-
military relations does little to advise governments on how to prevent a military coup in the 
immediate term. Both Finer’s recommendation to improve political culture and Roquie’s 
suggestion to balance the relative professionalism between the army and civilian government 
are better in theory than in practice. Attempts to deprofessionalize the military will be met 
with strong resistance by its officer corps while long term and fundamental problems, such as 
corruption and nepotism, limit the professionalism of the civilian government. Similarly, 
advising a state fearful of a coup d’etat that it needs to improve its level of political culture is 
an impractical short term solution. Finally, Desch’s framework on the origins of civil-military 
relations has a concrete, if unpalatable, policy recommendation to rectify poor civil-military 
relations. A dramatic increase in tensions or the outbreak of hostilities with a neighboring 
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state may help dampen tensions between a government and its military. However, as an 
organization with distinct and independent interests, a civilian government advocating 
conflict walks a fine line between increasing external threat and initiating a conflict the 
military fears it cannot win. In such an instance, the civilian government is likely to 
experience poor civil-military relations as well as a destructive and unsuccessful military 
adventure.  
In sum, the literature focused on causality in civil-military relations fails to provide a 
practicable solution to short term civil-military relations crises other than to engage in 
diversionary warfare against a weaker neighbor. This pessimistic analysis of the nature of 
civil-military relations in the developing world is largely consistent with the near constant 
coups and interstate warfare seen across much of the southern hemisphere. Puzzlingly, this 
wave of coups ended abruptly in the late 1990’s with the rise of stable autocratic regimes 
across the Middle East and South America. To help explain this shift, the applied vein of the 
civil-military relations literature in the 2000’s has focused on the practice of coup-proofing as 
an attempt for the state to institutionally prevent the successful implementation of a military 
coup during a time of peace. 
 Luttwak, in his seminal work Coup d’Etat, outlines the logistical and practical details 
of the conduct of a coup and its practical considerations. “It is therefore not concerned with a 
theoretical analysis of the coup d’etat, but rather with the formulation of the techniques which 
can be employed to seize power within a state.”20 Luttwak outlines a framework through 
which small portions of a government seize power in an extrajudicial manner. Although this 
work details the practical considerations for the conduct of a coup from the coup plotters’ 
perspective, it sparked a new vein in the literature that approaches the problem of coups and 
civil-military relations from a pragmatic perspective. Rather than rely on a systemic-level 
                                                
20 Luttwak, 1979 Preface 
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analysis, Luttwak and other scholars in the pragmatic vein of the literature, focus on the 
operational or tactical implications of poor civil-military relations. If a state cannot change 
the fundamental variable that makes it susceptible to a coup, whether it be political culture, 
professionalism, relative professionalism, or internal/external threat, it can construct state 
institutions that greatly decrease the likelihood of an attempted coup d’etat resulting in 
successful regime change. This next section will give a broad overview of the pragmatic 
literature on the practice, and costs, of coup-proofing a state.  
 Quinlevan and his conception of a “coup-proofed” state revolutionized conceptions of 
civil-military relations and helped explain the survival of regimes who the traditional 
literature would name as prime targets for coups. While other scholars addressed the 
precipitous drop in coups since the 1980s21, Quinlevan was the first to place this trend within 
a theoretical framework that acknowledged the emergence of a institutionalization of counter-
coup techniques into a fundamental shift in power between a state and its military.22 
Quinlevan introduces five common characteristics of coup-proofing; “(1) the effective 
exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical positions balanced with 
wider participation and less restrictive loyalty standards for the regime as a whole; (2) the 
creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; (3) the development of multiple 
internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of 
the military and one another with independent paths of communication to critical leaders; (4) 
the fostering of expertness in the regular military; and (5) the financing of such measures.”23 
However, Quinleven does not believe that coup-proofing as an institutional tool a conscious 
effort, but a by-product of fear. It is also not coincidence that these leaders at the forefront of 
this nascent movement, particularly in the Middle East, came to power through coups. “These 
leaders may not have initially understood what their regimes would come to be, but 
                                                
21 Be'eri 1982 
22 Quinlevan 1999 
23 Quinlevan 1999 133 
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successive decisions on who would or would not be trusted with power have led to the 
development of states in which much of the leaderships’ energy is now spent on protecting 
the regimes themselves.”24 The incredible costs of coup-proofing, and its secondary effects 
on military effectiveness in combat, spawned an entirely new vein of inquiry in the civil-
military relations literature.  
 Coup-proofing, now acknowledged as highly effective in ensuring the maintenance of 
autocratic regimes with non-professional militaries, comes with a multitude of costs. Biddle 
and Zirkle find that coup-proofed armies have incredible difficulties incorporating new and 
emerging technologies25, while later work by Quinleven argues that parallel regime-defense 
militaries are useless in the conduct of war as they are “stuck” in the capital protecting the 
regime.26 Ethnic stacking of the armed forces, an extremely common coup-proofing method, 
greatly increases the risk of the outbreak of civil war within the state.27 This emerging 
literature recognizes that rulers’ preferences are, especially in autocracies, distinct and often 
in opposition to the interests of the state itself. Militaries are not optimized for interstate 
conflict, but deliberately hamstrung by a ménage of coup-proofing measures enacted to 
minimize the threat of a coup.  
 The modern practice of civil-military relations is fundamentally divided by the 
practice of professionalism in modern western militaries, and coup-proofed, deliberately 
unprofessional militaries, in the developing world. Yet, across the literature there is a 
universal dismissal of the air force as a player in the “game” of the coup d’état. This section 
will briefly demonstrate the universality of this statement across the academic literature. 
Luttwak states that “Though most states have naval and air forces, as well as armies, we shall 
                                                
24 Quinlevan 1999 134 
25 Biddle and Zirkle 1996 
26 For one example, examine the conduct of Syrian elite units during the 1967 war with Israel who, despite 
desperate need for their deployment to the Golan heights, stayed in their barracks in Damascus and Holmes to 
maintain control of the regime. 
27 Roessler 2011 
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concentrate our attention on the latter because the procedures to be followed are usually the 
same for all three services, and because - with some exceptions - only land forces will be 
important from the point of view of the coup.”28 Quinleven concurs and contends that “The 
parallel military is almost inherently a ground combat force. Coup-proofing practices, 
however, frequently extend to air or naval forces - for example, restricting fuel (and hence 
range) for training flights is common in the Saudi air force. The essence of coup-proofing, 
though is to prevent troops from moving on the centers of the regime, a task best 
accomplished by a ground-based parallel military”.29 Pilster and Böhmelt follow with the 
claim that “Navies and air forces are only of limited suitability in the conduct or prevention 
of a coup. Coups d’état usually do not—at least if they proceed as planned—involve the 
large-scale use of direct force...The purpose is to quickly gain control and ensure the support 
of the existing state apparatus, not to destroy it. Neither tactical bombing of a country’s 
capital nor the shelling of naval towns seems suitable for achieving these goals”30 More 
recent work by Powell continues this trend of dismissing the role of the air force in coups. 
“Navies or air forces that lack ground soldiers, of course, could be said to have little chance 
at either undertaking a successful coup or combating one.” 31However, Luttwak also claims 
that “The effectiveness of modern soldiers, with their rapid transport, reliable 
communications and efficient weapons, means that even one single formation loyal to the 
regime could intervene and defeat the coup.... our investigation of the armed forces of the 
proposed target state must, therefore, be a complete one: we cannot leave out any force 
capable of intervention - however small.”32 Be’er in his work on Arab civil-military relations 
points out that “in Iraq - and only in Iraq - part of the air force has taken part in occasional 
                                                
28 The exceptions that Luttwak mentions are in geographically dispersed states such as Indonesia in which air or 
naval transport are vital to the success of a coup. Luttwak 1969 
29 Quinleven 1999 
30 Pilster & Böhmelt 2011 
31 Powell 2014 
32 Luttwak 1969 
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coups.”33 However, in the period since 1970, when the book was published, the air force is 
publically known to have attempted coups in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. No longer can 
air force coups be resigned to an Iraqi specific problem. It is the contention of this work that 
air forces, although admittedly not as vital as ground forces in the conduct of a coup, play 
that “small” but vital role in the civil-military relations of some coup-proofed states.  
Other than these offhand dismissals of navies and air forces, the literature since Hinze 
at the turn of the 20th century has treated militaries as single unitary actors and dismissed the 
fundamentally distinct attributes of the military branches. This thesis hopes to reintroduce 
that nuance to the study of civil-military relations through a plausibility probe of the logic of 
the use of the airpower and the conduct of the air force in the coup d’état.  
 
Methods 
 Any examination of the inner workings of the intelligence services or civil-military 
relations is extremely limited by the lack of unbiased and open-source evidence. In addition, 
the window for automatic declassification for secret documents in the US is 25 years and 
many relevant details of intelligence reports regarding coups remain classified for 
considerable periods beyond the 25 year mark. This places significant limitations on the 
methods through which coups, coup-proofing strategies, and elite fears of the air force can be 
studied.  
This inherent challenge in studying the coup d’état is well captured by Luttwak in the preface 
to his 2016 edition of Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook. “Over the nearly five decades 
since the original publication of this book, I have been told from time to time that it served as 
a guide for this or that coup.”34 Yet, there is only one case in which there is conclusive 
evidence that the book was studied by the leader of the 1972 coup attempt in Morocco. After 
                                                
33 Be’eri 1970 256 
34 Luttwak 2016 xx 
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the coup was defeated, and the leader was summarily executed, a “heavily annotated and 
blood-splattered copy of the French edition of this book was found on his desk.”35 In the 
absence of conclusive evidence regarding the plans and motivations of coup plotters, the most 
that can be accomplished is a logical framework in which to examine coups and coup-
proofing practices. Attempts to use a quantitative analysis to evaluate coups are especially 
vulnerable to this limitation in available and accurate data and, as a result, often solely focus 
on successful coups or improperly include coup attempts that were allowed to proceed in 
order to fill domestic political needs.36 This work takes the form of a plausibility probe that 
establishes a logical framework for the latent capacity and propensity of an air force to 
attempt coups and discuss the various methods through which leaders utilize coup-proofing to 
assuage fears born of that latent threat. 
This thesis begins with a comprehensive overview of coup attempts and plots involving the 
utilization of airpower by a military faction to seize power of the state. These instances are 
referred to throughout this work as “air force coups”. Once completed, these instances of air 
force coups were analyzed and a comprehensive framework established that captures the 
unique elements of air forces, and airpower, that substantially impact the manner in which 
they engage in coup d’etats. Finally, a trio of case studies were utilized to demonstrate the 
applicability of the framework in analysing the human and technological characteristics that 
affect the conduct of the air force in a coup d’etat.  
The cases in this thesis were selected based on two criteria. First, there must be sufficient 
declassified and academic information available regarding the specific details of the coup 
attempt or plot being examined. Many recent coup attempts, take the air force coup attempt in 
Turkey in 2016 for example, lack detailed and reliable open source accounts regarding the 
actions or even the identities of key leaders in the coup attempt. Other attempts, such as the 
                                                
35 Ibid xxi 
36 For example, this thesis does not consider Kenyan coup attempt as it did not utilize airpower and merely was 
a coup attempt by low level officers in the air force.  
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Saudi Arabian air force coup attempt 196937, were allegedly prevented with US assistance 
and, consequently, documents involving the attempts remain classified. Older coup attempts 
prior to the 1960’s are generally not subject to rigorous academic study as the field was in its 
infancy and, despite the availability of declassified documents, generally lack the detail 
necessary to examine the inner dynamics of the coup plotters themselves.  
Beyond the need for sufficiently detailed information regarding the conduct of the coup, there 
also must be sufficient information to reliably determine the motivations of coup plotters. 
Some of these human characteristics can be devised from the specifics of the attempt itself. 
However, others are more reliant on leadership fears and, in the presence of incomplete or 
unreliable information, are more difficult to isolate. These leadership fears are able to be 
isolated through the actions taken in the aftermath of a coup attempt. Namely, the methods of 
coup-proofing utilized by a government to assuage fears of air force disloyalty speak directly 
to the aspects of the air force a respective state finds most threatening. Backtracking 
leadership fears from their observable actions in coup proofing their air force provides 
valuable insights in a way that bypasses concerns of bias or limited information. Thus, in 
order to properly evaluate the presence of human characteristics in the coup attempts, the 
cases must involve the imposition of coup-proofing methods to restrain the air force 
following the coup attempt.  
The combination of these two limiting factors resulted in the selection of the 1963 coup in 
Iraq, the 1972 coup attempt in Morocco, and the 1980 coup attempt in Iran. In all three cases, 
detailed and reliable information regarding the role of the air force and airpower in the coup 
attempt is available. Additionally, each case features the imposition of extensive coup-
proofing in the aftermath of the attempt. The insights provided by these measures does 
effectively limit the cases to the Middle East-North African region where coup-proofing is 
                                                
37 Kechichian 2001, 104 
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almost universally implemented. However, despite this regional concentration, the framework 
draws upon technical and behavioral characteristics that are present in any air force 
worldwide. Thus, the case selection does not limit the applicability of the conclusions 
reached in this thesis to any particular region. By drawing upon twin sources of insight, this 
essay can utilize these cases to provide a comprehensive analysis of the unique nature of air 
force involvement in the conduct of the coup d’etat.  
Theory 
This essay begins with extensive literature on the nature and costs of coup-proofing practices 
and contends that, due to their high costs in effectiveness and capital, coup-proofing will not 
be applied unnecessarily. It will then establish that the coup-proofing of air forces is a nearly 
universal practice stretching back to the 1950s. The expenditure of such sums on coup-
proofing air forces rebuts the assertion made by the theoretical literature that the air force 
plays a negligible role in the conduct or prevention of the coup d’etat. Either these sums are 
being spent negligently or the theoretical literature is incorrect in omitting the air force from 
its analysis. This essay, and the relative frequency of air force coup attempts despite 
extensive coup-proofing measures, suggests the evidence supports latter explanation. This 
following section lays out a theoretical framework that suggests plausible threats posed by 
the air force in the conduct of a coup. 
 The characteristics of air forces that are directly relevant to their conduct in a coup d’etat fall 
under two distinct categories; Technological and Human Characteristics. The identification of 
these characteristics is derived from the airpower literature and intelligence analyses as well 
as the existing literature on coup-proofing.  
Technological Characteristic #1 
The first technological characteristic of the air force that poses a latent threat to their 
government is their high firepower to personnel ratio. Where each other branch of the armed 
17 
forces can bring significant firepower to a coup d’etat, such an action also increases the size 
of the coup and correspondingly raises the risk of detection. The firepower to personnel ratio 
in the air force is highly variable, but increases dramatically and concentrates firepower more 
than any other branch. Initially, there is a significant number of individuals involved in 
fueling, arming, and other logistical support for the aircraft at an air base. Additionally, 
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft are relatively defenseless on the tarmac and during take-
off. However, once a fighter or bomber pilot is in the air there a single pilot can join the coup 
independently and lend potentially pivotal fire support. At the “tip of the spear” the firepower 
of the whole air wing is under the total discretion of the pilots currently in the air. The other 
96% of air force personnel38 are relatively powerless to restrict the actions of pilots once jets 
are in the air. Thus, the minimum viable size for a coup plot is much smaller in an air force 
than in a ground force.  
This technological characteristic of the air force requires a significant degree of trust between 
a government and its pilots. Yet, in states with poor civil-military relations with governments 
fearful of a coup, that trust is by definition lacking. This characteristic was identified in both 
the limited theoretical literature on air force coups39 as well as specifically targeted through 
costly coup-proofing methods that attempted to increase the minimum viable size of an air 
force coup.40 Pilots in some air forces are forbidden to go on single patrols and others are 
subject to strict limitation of pilot autonomy during missions. “Iraqi pilots apparently cannot 
substitute their own judgement even when they are in a better position to direct their 
aircraft.”41 “(Redacted source) says that, on some missions involving more than one aircraft, 
only the leader knows the destination and the others just follow, dropping their bombs on 
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command.”42 These procedures significantly raise the coordination cost of an air force coup 
by requiring the plotters to involve multiple pilots and consequently lessens the tactical 
implications of the firepower to personnel ratio inherent in the air force. 
Technological Characteristic #2 
The second technological characteristic of air forces that contributes to their latent threat is 
their extremely high mobility. Typical coup-proofed states highly restrict entrance into the 
capital by all but a select group of elite praetorian units. However, the high mobility of fighter 
aircraft moving at, or above, the speed of sound make such restrictions largely irrelevant. 
This is not to say that regimes did not attempt to blunt this technological characteristic 
through coup-proofing methods. The Iranian clerical regime created a restricted airspace 
around Tehran and other population centers. “Fighter aircraft flying defensive patrols were 
not permitted to fly closer than 65 kilometers to major Iranian cities because, (REDACTED) 
the regime feared a possible coup attempt.”43 Other restrictions included strict limits on the 
amount of fuel issued to pilots on defensive patrols or training exercises.44 These restrictions 
have significant and negative impacts on combat performance and a marginal, at best, impact 
on the ability of the air force to attempt a coup d’etat. An Iranian F-5 Phantom II fighter 
bomber would only be delayed just over a minute by the 65 km buffer zone; hardly enough to 
alter their ability of the air force to support or launch a coup attempt.45  
Technological Characteristic #3 
The final technological characteristic of air forces that poses a threat to the regime is 
the relative immunity of aircraft to traditional coup-proofing methods. Praetorian guard units, 
the elite military units stationed in the capital, are generally highly trained infantry armed 
with anti-tank weaponry to nullify the advantage the regular army holds in armored vehicles 
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and tank forces. However, these units are largely useless against fixed wing aircraft and have 
minimal utility against rotary aircraft unless specifically outfitted with MANPAD (man 
portable air defense) weaponry. Building off of the second characteristic, geographical coup-
proofing is largely ineffective in preventing an air force coup. Restricting access to the 
capital, as mentioned in the previous section, is largely ineffective when dealing with a threat 
from the air. States commonly station personnel from various competing groups in the 
regions surrounding the capital to prevent any one group from having a clear path to march 
on the seat of government. This is also relatively ineffective when dealing with rebel air 
squadrons as they can simply fly over ground units.  
Coup-proofing methods seeking to reduce this technological threat include strict 
divisions between air defense and the air force itself, arming coup-proofing units with anti-air 
weaponry and dividing the air force itself. The Egyptian military, for instance, has four 
distinct branches; the Army, Navy, air force, and Air Defense with Air Defense and the air 
force falling under separate chains of command.46 In addition, elite coup-proofing units are 
sometimes equipped with light anti-aircraft weaponry including man-portable surface to air 
missiles (MANPADs). The infamous Khamis brigade in Libya, for example, was equipped 
with SA-7 Strela surface to air missiles as well as brigade level radar equipment.47 While 
most states lack the funding to field a full parallel air force, states do commonly introduce 
divisions within the air force to use it to balance against itself. Qaddafi distrusted the Libyan 
air force and created a “so-called ‘Guard Squadron’ of MiG-23s”.48 The Saudi Arabian 
national guard, a light force designed as a counterweight to the regular army, is in the process 
of equipping an aviation brigade which will be stationed just outside the capital and equipped 
with a variety of light and heavy assault aircraft.49 The royal guard, the equivalent of the 
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American secret service, purchased 10 Apache Block III gunships in 2010 giving a 
previously light infantry force significant air assault capabilities.50 However, even in the 
event of parallel air forces, the first two technological characteristics, firepower and mobility, 
give rebellious airpower a significant first mover advantage. Rebel airpower can disable or 
destroy loyal coup-proofing air force units with relative ease by targeting the airstrips of 
loyalist airbases.  
In sum, these technological characteristics of the air force as a branch generate a 
latent threat to the government that is difficult to assuage with traditional coup-proofing 
practices. However, states have responded by instituting air force specific coup-proofing 
measures designed to limit the mobility, firepower, and ability of units to strike regime power 
centers.  
Human Characteristics Inherent to the Air Force 
Despite their ability to explain the capacity of the air force to attempt a coup, these 
technological factors fail to explain the relatively high propensity of air forces to attempt 
coups given their incredibly low rates of success. For explanations regarding propensity, this 
work will turn to the human characteristics of the air forces as an institution. The 
technological intensity of the air force makes them difficult to ethnically stack, require high 
rates of foreign training and instruction, and creates an innate resistance to purges or political 
indoctrination given their relatively irreplaceable skillset.  
 
Human Characteristic #1 
The intense physical and educational requirements of the officer corps in the air force make 
the branch relatively difficult to ethnically stack and bring within the true “elite” of the armed 
forces. First, a very small segment of any population will meet the strenuous physical and 
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educational requirements necessary to excel as an air force pilot or even work in skilled 
logistical support positions. Given that the elite groups within most coup-proofed societies 
are incredibly small, even the sprawling thirty thousand member al-Saud family makes up 
less than .1 percent of the Saudi Arabian population51, this makes it difficult to draw the pilot 
cadre of an air force from the true elites. Attempts at ethnic stacking therefore operate at 
lower levels such as tribal or religious cleavages rather than direct family ties. The Libyan air 
force was “staffed almost exclusively”52 by Gaddafi's tribe and the Syrian air force heavily 
staffed by Alawites53. In the Libyan case, the true elite were blood relatives of Gaddafi while 
secondary positions were held by in-laws.54 The tertiary positions were drawn from the 
greater Qadadfa tribal community and it is at this level that, despite the importation of Syrian 
pilots, that the recruitment for the air force was conducted. It is clear, however, that the air 
force was entirely outside the benefits and privileges afforded to “elite” units. The pay given 
to the air force “paled in comparison to elite ground units like the vaunted 32nd Brigade...As 
a former Mirage F1 pilot based at Mitiga Air Base, who defected to Zintan early in the 
revolution, noted: “I have a master’s degree in aeronautics and am a Mirage pilot. Why 
should I make less than a truck driver in the Khamis Brigade?”55  
The government in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation experienced similar 
difficulties in recruiting loyal pilots due to the rigors of the occupation. 
“The pool of qualified pilot candidates from which Kabul can choose is 
limited. Most of the draft age men would prefer to fight the regime than join 
it, in our judgment. Many technologically competent and educated Afghans 
- better able to master flying skills than the majority of poorly educated 
Afghans - fled the country following the Soviet invasion.... The stringent 
physical examinations designed to measure an individual's tolerance to 
stressful flying conditions further reduces the number of eligible pilot 
candidates.”56 
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When states are unable to fill vacancies due to the technological and physical constraints of 
the pilot corps, they have little to know ability to recruit based on ethnic or political factors. 
This thesis therefore contends that most attempts to stack the air force with political or ethnic 
elites are relatively unsuccessful as the recruitment of pilots and skilled personnel must reach 
beyond the fraction of a percent who are members of the true elite. 
 
Human Characteristic #2 
In societies with poor civil-military relations, and therefore fear coup d’état, there is an 
almost universal presence of foreign training for both pilots as well as skilled logistical 
personnel. This practice is due to the technological intensity of military flight schools, the 
high cost of such institutions, and the relatively small size of air forces in developing nations. 
This extensive foreign interaction leads to fears that these officers will be susceptible to 
foreign influence or will be unwilling to engage in combat against the nation who trained 
them. Particularly small or emerging air forces, for example Libya in the 1980s, may even 
decide to hire foreign pilots rather than train its own citizens.57 On the whole, this extensive 
interaction with foreign powers creates a latent fear of disloyalty regardless of the actual 
disposition of the officer corps.  
 
Human Characteristic #3 
The final human characteristic that gives the air force a relatively high propensity to launch a 
coup d’état is its innate resistance to purges or severe discipline for disloyalty. This final 
characteristic draws from the first two and contends that, due to their relatively rare skillset 
and extensive costs involved with training, any purge within the air force is far more costly 
than one of the ground forces. The technological intensity of the branch as a whole makes 
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some skilled logistical workers and pilots simply irreplaceable in the short term. Therefore, a 
purge, or even the firing of a handful of officers, is a high cost endeavour both in financial 
resources and in combat effectiveness. In the case of Iran, a CIA intelligence report details 
that “air force readiness was harder hit by these purges than that of the Army because air 
force requirements for technical expertise are more critical.”58 Unwilling to incur such costs, 
states are forced to accept a much higher degree of “normal” disloyalty or dissatisfaction than 
in any other branch of the Armed Forces. Even following attempted coups, states are often 
unable to completely purge the air force and must retain or rehire skilled airmen to maintain 
any degree of combat effectiveness.  
In sum, the human characteristics of the air force as a branch gives a solid foundation that 
explains the universal mistrust garnered by air forces in coup-proofed states. Air force 
officers are purge resistant, foreign trained, and impossible to draw solely from the innermost 
circle of political elites in society. This thesis contends that this combination of human 
factors makes it likely that the air force will have a relatively high propensity to launch coups 
when compared to the ground forces and elite units. As air forces are by far the smallest 
branch of any developing military, and are almost non-existent in much of the developing 
world, the total number of air force coup attempts remains relatively small and an inaccurate 
measure of their relative inclination to disloyalty. The continued and relatively frequent 
attempts by air forces to launch coup d’états, despite their nearly universal failure59, 
demonstrates the extent to which the human characteristics of air forces lead to a high 
propensity as a branch to attempt coups.  
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This thesis has so far established a theoretical framework that identified a set of human and 
technological factors that present a latent coup threat. The following section will lay out the 
two plausible routes that an air force coup d’état might take and analyse how they draw upon 
the latent characteristics identified in the previous section. First, the air force can act 
independently of the other branches of the armed forces and attempt a decapitation coup. 
Secondly, the air force can ally with a ground force in the army, paramilitary, or elite units to 
overthrow the government with support from the air. This section will draw upon the innate 
human and technological characteristics to explore these two categories of air force coups. 
The decapitation method of air force coup d’états draws heavily on the high firepower 
to personnel ratio in air forces as well as their ability to simply fly over most traditional coup-
proofing forces. Coup attempts that follow this track include, among others, the 1969 coup 
attempt in Saudi Arabia, the 1972 coup attempt in Morocco, and the 1980 coup attempt in 
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Iran. These coup attempts generally involve a small number of officers and may not have any 
collaboration with ground forces. In a highly personalistic regime, the coup plotters can 
conclude that the death of the head of state will initiate such instability that there is a 
reasonable chance military will be forced to, or can be encouraged to, take control of the 
state. This enables a small group of air force officers to precipitate a coup regardless of the 
overall inclinations of the armed forces. 
Air forces that do have support from a ground arm of the military adopt the second 
method of air force coups and provide air support to rebel ground forces. This, however, does 
not mean that they will forgo a decapitation strike on key leadership and communications 
centers. The initial stage of any coup is to quickly seize control over key figures and media 
facilities to promote confusion and prevent the regime from mobilizing to crush the 
rebellion.60 As media and telecommunications are relatively difficult to completely control, 
Luttwak proposes the objective should be monopolization of media through the silencing of 
all non-coup affiliated media sources through sabotage.61 He also calls for the control of 
major infrastructure leading into and out of the capital city.62 The air force, through precision 
strikes, is uniquely suited to carry out these missions in the first minutes of a coup attempt. 
However, the consolidation of power following a coup attempt involving both air and ground 
forces is more complex. Loyalist airstrips must be seized or disabled to maintain rebel air 
superiority and a balance must be maintained between seizing the capital and destroying it. 
Initial strikes on leadership targets must be followed by insertion of ground forces to ensure 
the death or capture of key figures in the regime. Aircraft must be tasked with enforcing a no 
fly zone to prevent the regime from airlifting loyal troops from rural bases or deploying 
forces to seize rebel airfields. However, the addition of even meager airpower can enable 
relatively small elite units to pose a significant threat to a regime. Conventional coup-
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proofing methods used to balance these elite units, commonly in the form of either large 
ideological militias or ground forces stationed in border zones, are potentially balanced 
through the application of airpower. If rebel pilots are willing to bomb loyalist positions, or 
loyalist pilots are willing to bomb advancing rebels, they have the potential to turn the tide of 
a coup d’état. The use of loyalist airpower to turn the tide of the 1972 coup attempt in El 
Salvador is a demonstration this potentially pivotal role the air force can play in the conduct 
or prevention of a traditional ground force centric coup d’état.63  
Given the relatively high propensity to attempt coups and latent capacity of the air 
forces to attempt coups despite extensive coup-proofing measures, regimes have a logical 
basis to fear the air force. The intensity of this fear, however, is dependent on the unit of 
analysis. This thesis contends that the government as a whole has a relatively low fear of the 
air force. The government fears the instability generated by coup attempts, yet is more fearful 
of genuine threats to continuity of the regime itself. As air forces have an extremely low 
success rate in succeeding in coups, they present a low risk that can be assuaged through 
coup-proofing. However, leadership have a more acute fear of the air force that is very 
difficult to assuage despite extensive coup-proofing. While coup proofing methods can 
prevent rebellious ground forces from even reaching the capital, let alone striking at the 
leadership themselves, the air force has the potential to bypass loyal regime forces and 
threaten the lives of the leadership. Therefore, personalistic regimes are particularly 
vulnerable to air force coups as the death of a key leader or a very small group would be a 
potentially destabilizing loss to the regime.  
The near universal practice of coup-proofing the air force in an attempt to assuage 
these elite fears results in a dramatic reduction in combat effectiveness and professionalism in 
the air force itself. This essay contends that the extensive coup-proofing in the air force, in 
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addition to its limitation of air force capacity to attempt coups, creates a feedback loop that 
decreases morale and professionalism leading to increased propensity.64 This unintended side 
effect of coup-proofing is well established in the broader literature on coup d’états.65 Given 
the inherent difficulties associated with coup-proofing the air force, this thesis contends that 
extreme methods of air force coup achieve marginal decreases in technical capabilities while 
drastically increasing propensity .66 This feedback limits the ability of any state to completely 
eliminate the risk of air force disloyalty and entrenches lingering leadership fears. 
Case Studies 
Now that the thesis has established a framework through which to evaluate the role of 
the air force in the conduct of the coup d’état, it will now illustrate the utility of this 
framework through a series of case studies (Morocco, 1972; Iraq, 1963; Iran, 1980) to 
analyze its explanatory utility in evaluating aspects of civil-military relations specific to the 
role of the air force.  
Case 1: Morocco 1972 
An examination of the 1972 air force coup attempt in Morocco, and its aftermath, will 
demonstrate the applicability of this thesis’ theoretical framework. Following a brief history 
of the coup attempt this section will be an evaluation of the extent to which human and 
technical factors led to the implementation of specific coup-proofing methods used to 
constrain the Moroccan Air Force.  
Civil-military relations in Morocco were tumultuous throughout the 1960s culminating in a 
palace coup in 1970 when soldiers attempted to seize the royal palace during a party hosted 
for foreign dignitaries. Historically, the monarchy relied on powerful families in the civil 
service (Maghzen and Shaifiran), commercial interests (Fassi) and traditionally military 
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oriented Berber families.67 This system was relatively stable and the military played little to 
no role in politics. However, by the 1960s the “rents” paid to these power bases in return for 
support for the monarchy had become concentrated within the economic and bureaucratic 
elites while the military was left out of these sources of income.68 Further economic and 
military reforms exacerbated this trend as the military, previously dominated by the Berber 
ethnic class, was being transformed along western lines with an influx of young technically 
trained Arab officers who were given command of the newest armor and air units. The King 
had, for decades, attempted to maintain the loyalty of the senior officers by preventing 
promotions within the army that would bring Arabs into the top ranks. In fact, prior to 1959 
there were no promotions at all and by 1962 only thirty officers with ranks higher than 
captain.69 However, the King attempted to rectify these complaints made by the officer corps 
by increasing pay, giving out promotions, and bring, what had been a relatively professional 
military, “into the royal patronage network.”70 These reforms did little to modify the concerns 
of a senior officer corps surrounded by young Arab officers who appeared to be gaining the 
king’s favor and quickly demonstrated that they were “better qualified than their seniors for 
command over highly mechanized units”.71  
This foundation of distrust and brooding resentment boiled over in 1971 with a general palace 
coup involving five of the fourteen generals in the Moroccan armed forces. On 10, July 1971 
1500 cadets from the NCO school in Ahermoumou seized control of the royal palace during a 
state function. They were under the command of Brig. Gen. Mohamed Medbouh, the 
commander of the palace guard, but underestimated the authority of the King to command the 
loyalty of the rank and file.72 After a few hours, Medbouh was shot and the cadets switched 
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their support to the monarch.73 General Oufkir, Minister of the Interior, and Gen Ben Omar, 
the Minister of Minister of Posts, Telephone, and Telegraph, were given authority by the king 
to restore order and purge the armed forces. The resulting purge resulted in a decapitation of 
the senior Berber leadership in the military and the deaths of nine of the top sixteen officers 
in the armed forces. The majority of the cadets involved in the coup were released and 
evidence presented at their trial supported their claims that “they were misled and duped into 
thinking that they were going to the palace to protect the king.”74 The underlying tensions, 
the forces involved, and the measures taken to purge/secure the armed forces following the 
10th of July coup attempt are, on the whole, typical of a coup plot in a highly personalist 
regime. Senior officers, upset about the distribution of power and wealth rents within the 
elite, lashed out but their “attempt to overthrow the monarchy represented a gross 
underestimation of the king's ability to rally instantaneous support for the established order.75  
The 1972 Moroccan Coup Attempt 
The second coup in 1972, however, defies most models of the coup d’état as it was 
conducted solely by the air force and targeted the King himself as the lynchpin of the regime 
itself. Following the 1971 coup, and the resulting purge of Berber officers at the highest ranks 
of the armed forces, the relative professionalism that defined the role of the Moroccan armed 
forces in the first half of the 20th century had ended. Authority to reorganize and completely 
reshape the armed forces was given to General Oufkir as the new Minister of Defense and he 
proceeded to craft a new army “designed to reduce the possibility of future uprisings”.76 Yet, 
once power had been consolidated, Oufkir himself launched a coup attempt. While flying 
back from a trip to France the king’s 747 was attacked by F-5 fighter aircraft from the 
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Moroccan air base at Kenitra.77 His pilot managed to land the plane and, with the king’s 
survival, the plot quickly fell apart.78 This next section will evaluate the applicability of the 
logical framework outlined in this thesis to the 1972 air force coup.  
First, in terms of technical characteristics of airpower, the 1972 coup attempt drew 
heavily on all three factors in the framework. The high firepower to personnel ratio made the 
coup attempt viable despite its incredibly small size. Contemporary declassified documents 
show the coup actually involved only “14 or 15 officers”79 and 3 to 4 jet aircraft80 Despite its 
incredibly small size, the attempt drew upon the high mobility inherent in airpower to strafe 
the airport at Rabat as well as launch an air attack on the Royal Palace.81 Ground forces 
would not have been able to penetrate royal defenses and strike either of these vulnerable 
targets let alone both. Finally, traditional coup-proofing methods were ineffective against this 
airborne threat. The royal guard in Rabat consists of a thousand infantry with no anti-air 
capabilities. Additionally, the remaining fighters at the Kenitra air base, representing nearly 
all anti air capabilities in the Moroccan armed forces, were either unable or unwilling to 
respond quickly enough to intervene. A rebel force of scarcely more than a dozen disloyal 
troops were able to strike at the heart of a personalist monarchy and came within a hair's 
breadth of success. “The king has survived not because of any "strong position" but because 
of some atrociously bad gunnery by the Moroccan Air Force....Available evidence indicates 
that the would-be regicides aimed at eliminating Hassan and getting rid of the corrupt and 
wasteful entourage that surrounds him. The eventual demise of the monarchy itself 
apparently was intended.”82 
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The tracking of the role of human factors in motivating actions of coup plotters is 
more difficult to discern. However, the three identified characteristics of air forces did appear 
to play a role in the 1972 coup attempt. The innate resistance of the air force to purges and 
political discipline is evident in the lack of significant organisational changes to its structure 
following the 1971 coup attempt. The other branches were heavily reorganized with “infantry 
and armored brigades hav(ing) been disbanded and their former organic elements deployed 
throughout the country”.83 Yet the air force remained highly concentrated with all of its 
modern fighter aircraft concentrated under the command of a single officer at the Kenitra 
airbase. In addition, following the coup, the air force experienced a precipitous drop in 
combat effectiveness as a purge of 200 officers and men resulted in the grounding of over 
75% of Moroccan combat aircraft. By September of 1972, every single officer and soldier 
stationed at the Kenitra air base would be forced to stand trial.84 The innate resistance of the 
air force as a branch to purges does not mean that they cannot occur, but that government will 
be loath to enact them due to their extreme cost. the air force was left largely untouched 
following the 1971 coup attempt and only purged when, according to CIA national 
intelligence estimates, “The question of when - not if- the next attempt on King Hassan’s life 
will be made is unanswerable......further blows at the King are certain; there is no way of 
knowing when or where they will come.”85  
The other two human characteristics present less strongly in the Moroccan case. 
Although the Moroccan Air Force was trained and equipped by the United States and France, 
this did not contribute significantly to impressions of their loyalty to the monarchy. 
Additionally, while the Berber class was heavily represented in the armed forces prior to the 
1971 coup attempt, their influence greatly reduced by the purges following the attempt. The 
ethnic divide in the Moroccan military was not purposeful ethnic stacking on the part of King 
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Hassan, but a combination of tribal and colonial structures that minimized the role of the 
Arab population in the armed forces. In fact, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, rather than 
ethnically stack the military, efforts were made to conscript Arab citizens to form a 
representative military. As ethnic stacking was not attempted in Morocco, the air force’s 
relative resistance to this form of coup-proofing is not applicable.  
Finally, in the Moroccan case there is clear evidence supporting the feedback loop 
relating the imposition of coup-proofing methods in the air force and their propensity to 
attempt a coup d’état. This relationship is well established in the literature86 yet its specific 
attribution as one of the causes of the 1972 coup attempt is significant. The imposition of a 
military security official, rather than an air force officer, as commander of the air force is 
referenced by the presidential daily brief, the day after the attempt, as the source of “ill 
feelings among air force officers who had hoped that the command would be awarded within 
the service.”87 
 
 Morocco Iraq Iran 
Technological Factors    
Firepower High Reliance   
Mobility Medium Reliance   
Immunity to ground 
forces 
High Reliance   
Human Factors    
Hard to stack N/A   
Foreign Training    
Resistant to discipline High Reliance   
 
                                                
86 Hicham 2014 40, Gaub 2013 230, MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin 2006 651 
87 DOC_0005993469 
33 
In sum, the air force attempt to carry out a decapitation coup in Morocco drew heavily 
upon technological characteristics within this thesis’ logical framework as well as one of the 
three human characteristics. In a time of intense distrust of the armed forces, and the 
wholesale reorganization of the Moroccan ground forces, the air force was able to come close 
to decapitating the regime. As a contemporary intelligence assessment details, the failure of 
the coup does not speak to the strength of the regime or the weakness of the coup plot but 
merely random chance and bad aim. 88 
Case #2 Iraq 1963 
Civil-military relations in Iraq following the 1958 coup that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy 
can perhaps be best described as outright hostile. In the fifteen years following the 1958 
coup, there were “four distinct changes in regime, ten coups d’état or attempted coups, and at 
least 14 cabinets with an average longevity of less than a year.”89 Not until the rise of Saddam 
Hussein Tikriti, and his more than three decades of dictatorship, did a civilian government 
maintain absolute control over the Iraqi military. This section will give a brief overview of 
the role of the air force in the 1963 Ba’athist coup before turning to long term trends and 
controls instituted by the regime to ensure loyal control over Iraqi airpower. As the coup was 
successful, and carried out by the Ba’ath party that would eventually gain lasting power in 
1968, this case considers the case of limitations imposed on a, nominally, loyal air force in 
coup-proofed military. 
The 1963 Iraqi Coup 
 The reigning regime led by Abdalkarim Qasim was not unprepared for a coup within 
the armed forces and the regime “turned the Ministry of Defence compound... into a fortified 
camp.”90 In addition, Qasim’s nineteenth brigade, 2000 infantry equipped with heavy 
weapons and antiaircraft guns, and his brother-in-law’s Fifth Division, complete with infantry 
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tanks and Mig-19 fighter bombers, were stationed in and around the capital to protect the 
heart of the regime.91 In fact, the aerial contingent at the ar-Rashid base was staffed 
specifically with communist pilots and crews to ensure their loyalty to the regime and 
equipped with the newest Mig-19 fighters available to the Iraqi armed forces.92 It logical to 
construe that, between the inclusion of aircraft in the coup-proofing forces at ar-Rashid and 
the contingent of anti aircraft weapons at the Ministry of Defense, airpower was seen as a 
fundamental part of any coup attempt against the Qasim regime. Arrayed against these forces 
were relatively small number of Ba’ath military officers which had just suffered a spate of 
forced retirements in January and February of 1963.93 These purges of early 1963 came in 
response to the Ba’ath party’s support for a popular uprising in response to rising fuel prices 
during a popular revolt in March of 1961. However, the movement was quickly crushed by 
military and police forces. The period between this defeat and the successful coup in early 
1963 was marked with numerous coup plots which were quickly detected and purged by 
Qasim’s intelligence services.94 
The coup of 1963 began in the early morning of February 8th 1963 with the 
assassination of Brigadier General Jalal al-Awqati, the communist commander of the air 
force and the subsequent aerial assault on the airstrip at ar-Rashid and its contingent of Mig-
19s. Once air superiority over Baghdad was achieved, either by cowing or disabling the 
aircraft at ar-Rashid, rebel aircraft began a “heavy attack by air”95 on the Ministry of 
Defence. Tanks were dispatched to the radio broadcasting station in Abu-Ghurayb as well as 
the radio station in the Capital to disable government communications and “quickly 
announced the coup and the death of Qassim.”96 Qassim was, however, not dead and gathered 
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crowds of communist supporters as he barricaded himself in the Ministry of Defense. His 
calls for air support from the ninth squadron’s Mig 19s failed to reach the airbase due to 
interception at the ar-Rashid telephone exchange and, had they managed to get through, it is 
unclear as to whether there were any loyal aircraft capable of takeoff following the airstrikes 
of that morning.97 Rebel armor and paratroopers surrounded the Ministry of Defense and 
began an assault that lasted until past noon the following day covered by a constant rain of 
rockets and bombs from the rebel aircraft.98 “Ministry buildings suffered considerable 
damage...(and) most-important for the success of the operation, both telephone and radio 
communications were put out of action.”99 In total, “eighteen planes made 44 sorties and shot 
72 missiles at the compound”100 during the first day of the assault. By the second day at noon 
the remainder of the army, as well as many of communists on the streets and Qassim’s elite 
19th brigade, defected to the side of the rebels or retired to their homes and barracks.101 
Qassim and his top leadership were captured and a nation-wide purge of communists, 
suspected and actual, began. Despite its extensive practice of coup-proofing, the Qassim 
regime fell to a “combined military operation”102 in which the “al-Habbaniya military camp 
and especially its air base played a vital role in the success of the coup because from there 
were realized the repeated air attacks on important targets.”103  
The Ba’athist regime established in the February coup suffered a coup attempt of their 
own on the 13th of November 1963 from within the Ba’athist party itself. The leader of the 
coup, Mundhir al-Wandawi, launched the attempt by seizing aircraft and bombing the ar-
Rashid air base and strafing the presidential palace.104 Although the coup fizzled out, five 
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days later, the general staff launched a determined coup involving airstrikes on National 
Guard headquarters leading to the downfall of the first Iraqi Ba’athist regime.105 Air power 
had played a key role in three consecutive coups in Iraq in just a single year. 
The Iraqi coups drew upon a wholly different combination of the technological and 
human characteristics inherent to the air force than the previous case of Morocco. In terms of 
technological factors, both coups involved a heavy reliance on the mobility and firepower of 
airpower to neutralize government ground forces. However, the rebel coalition of ground and 
air forces was relatively large compared to the Moroccan coup as it involved hundreds to 
thousands rather than dozens of soldiers. Thus, despite the fact that airpower played a vital 
role in tipping the balance, its ability to lower the minimum viable coup size was not 
demonstrated in the Iraqi coup. Additionally, unlike the Moroccan coup, the Iraqi elite forces 
were prepared for an air force coup d’état. The elite units at the Ministry of Defense were 
equipped with “18 antitank and anti-aircraft guns”106 and a small segment of the air force at 
the ar-Rashid Air Base was politically stacked and equipped with superior weaponry. 
Nonetheless, these forces were unable to mount any significant resistance against rebel 
aircraft reflecting the offence superior state of aircraft/air defense technology in Iraq in the 
1960s. This balance is maintained in most developing states to the modern day with the 
possible exception of Egypt which has a relatively advanced air defense network.  
Turning to human factors, the first characteristic of air forces in their innate resistance 
to stacking along ethnic or political lines is present in the Iraqi case. The ability of the Qassim 
regime to stack elite units of the air force was demonstrated in the communist leadership of 
the air force as well as the entire air contingent at the ar-Rashid base. However, the inability 
of the Qassim regime to expand this ethnic stacking to the entirety of the air force allowed 
rebel pilots to use the high mobility and firepower of the relatively inferior rebel aircraft to 
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disable the loyal air forces in the first minutes of the coup. However, the foreign training of 
the Iraqi Air Force and the resistance of air forces to discipline played little, if any, role in the 
1963 Ba’athist coup. 
In sum, the 1963 coup in Iraq ably combined airpower with armored ground forces to 
launch a successful coup d’état against an early form of coup-proofed government. Command 
and control was centralized, intelligence agencies heavily monitored the military, and 
institutions of government were heavily fortified against assault. Key leadership in the 5th 
division were politically stacked with communists as well as family members of Qassim 
himself. Finally, large numbers of communists within Baghdad itself were willing to flood 
the streets and arm themselves to prevent a Ba’athist coup.107 Yet each of these regime 
bullworks of support burst under the combined pressure of armor and air assault.  
 
 Morocco Iraq Iran 
Technological Factors    
Firepower High Reliance Medium Reliance  
Mobility Medium Reliance High Reliance  
Immunity to ground 
forces 
High Reliance High Reliance  
Human Factors    
Hard to stack N/A High Reliance  
Foreign Training  Low Reliance  
Resistant to discipline High Reliance Low Reliance  
 
Iran 1980 
 This section will begin by briefly recounting the events of the Iranian revolution of 
1978, coup-proofing strategies employed by the Shah, and the restructuring of the armed 
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forces following the rise of the clerical regime under Ayatollah Khomeini. It will then turn to 
an overview of the Iranian Air Force coup attempt of 1980 and analyse the applicability of 
the six human and technological characteristics to the Iranian case. 
 The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was not a coup or military revolt like those in 
neighboring Iraq or throughout the middle east. Rather than an internal revolt by elites, the 
Iranian revolution was a popular uprising organized by a network of Shia clerics and mosques 
that orchestrated “widespread popular resistance to the state.”108 Marches organized around 
the Islamic calendar and, when fired upon, utilized the funeral processions of the martyrs as 
focal points of the struggle.109 The Shah, loath to rely solely on military force to quell the 
protests, offered political reforms in a “carrot-and-stick policy.”110 However, the Shah’s 
military and security apparatus was deemed capable of maintaining control with DIA and 
CIA analyses concurring that the protests posed little threat the stability of the regime.111 Yet, 
over time, the lower ranks of the military began to desert rather than continue to fire on 
protesters and by winter 1978 “desertions had apparently reached 1,000 per day.”112 This was 
supported by the clerical leadership who provided “civilian clothing and travel money”113 to 
soldiers willing to defect and return home. With growing protests and uncertain messages 
from Washington regarding support for a bloody repression, the Shah abdicated and the 
civilian government under Bakhtiar “was losing control and... the army was rapidly 
disintegrating.”114 Indecisive action on the part of the shah had allowed the protests to reach a 
critical mass and become an existential threat to the regime. coup-proofing had succeeded in 
preventing the military from posing a threat, yet crippled their ability to successfully repress a 
genuinely popular uprising from the population. The new Shia regime under Ayatollah 
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Khamenei would experience the opposite problem; genuine support from the lower classes 
but extreme disloyalty and unrest in the upper echelons of society and the armed forces.  
Once the clerical regime had established its control over the new government, it 
immediately conducted purges throughout the military. “The Iranian military.... (was) in a 
state of disarray. The Army, which had almost 300,000 personnel under the Shah, now [as of 
September 1980] numbers only about 150,000 men.”115 The other branches experienced 
similar reductions in personnel and “professional military men are appalled by the clerics’ 
disdain for their profession.”116 This resentment and anger reached a critical point in the July 
10th plot in which planes from the Nojeh air base would rapidly strike critical regime targets, 
including “Ayatollah Khomenei's residence, the presidential palace, the seat of government, 
and several Revolutionary Guards barracks”117, before rebel ground forces would seize the 
capital. Other planes were dispatched to bomb air-force bases to prevent the regime from 
launching aircraft to contest rebel air dominance.118 Commandos were designated to seize 
communications facilities and ensure that Khomeini had not survived the initial assault from 
three heavily armed fighter-bombers.119 Finally, police and irregular civilian forces from the 
Southern parts of Tehran would march on the center of the city to provide the appearance of a 
popular uprising and give legitimacy to the coup.120  
There is some disagreement in sources regarding how close the plot came to fruition. 
A CIA assessment of the plot states that “On 10 July Bani-Sadr announced that a coup had 
been discovered at the Shahroki Airbase near Hamadan where about a half dozen officers 
were shot while preparing to take off.”121 However, a Rand report from 1987 indicates that 
the regime had knowledge of the coup as early as the 8th of July, two days before the coup 
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attempt, and states that “officials in Tehran have admitted that they were informed about the 
plot several weeks in advance and that they closely followed the course of its preparation, 
ready to crush it at the appropriate moment.122 A detailed third accounting of the plot by 
Mark Gasiorowski in 2002 is achieved through interviews with “five key leaders of the plot 
and with six other knowledgeable figures.”123 Two competing narratives quickly emerge 
between the government account of the coup and that of the surviving plotters. Where the 
Rand report and the government account claim the government had extensive prior 
knowledge of the plot, this is challenged by Gasiorowski and his sources who participated in 
the coup. They describe a complex “compartmentalized ‘cell’ structure [that] protected the 
identities of many participants and enabled others to go into hiding before they could be 
arrested.”124 While the arrest of the contingent of pilots and officers at the Nuzhih air base 
proved fatal to the coup, the escape of “most of the 700-750 military participants and 300-400 
civilian participants were never arrested.”125 It is implausible that, had the Iranian 
government had days or weeks of notice, not a single of the coup participants at the “Tehran 
base J, the Isfahan and Mashad army bases, the police, or the navy were arrested.”126 At a 
minimum, the fact that commando teams stationed in Tehran spent the night in safe houses 
and then, not having received the signal to attack, dispersed unmolested indicates that the 
government was unaware of the extent of the plot.127 Regardless of the details, all available 
sources indicate that the July 10th plot was the most serious attempt by the military to 
reinstitute the rule of the Shah in the pre-Iran Iraq war era.  
As this coup attempt was unsuccessful, the following analysis of the coup plot must 
then be based on the planned actions rather than the rather limited activities actually carried 
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out by the coup plotters. In terms of technological characteristics, the initial decapitation 
strikes planned for key clerical regime targets combine the opening salvos of both the Iraqi 
coup of 1963 as well as the decapitation coup attempt in Morocco in 1972. The personalist 
Iranian clerical regime made them structurally susceptible to a decapitation coup, while the 
revolutionary guard coup-proofing units required the coup plot to follow up decapitation 
strikes with tactical airstrikes on regime soldiers. This combination relied heavily on the high 
mobility of the air force as well as their high firepower to personnel ratio. It also counted on 
the ability of the air force to disrupt or destroy revolutionary guard units while coup units 
were converging from outlying bases into the capital itself.  
Turning to human factors, no attempts were made to stack the Iranian Air Force prior 
to July plot and the air force was purged, despite disastrous effects on effectiveness, at similar 
rates to the other branches. The role of foreign training in encouraging or precipitating the 
coup attempt is also unknown. From the conduct of the coup plot itself, it is also difficult to 
assess the role of human factors as the coup was neither fully implemented nor successful in 
establishing a government. The evaluation of these key characteristics will be accomplished 
in the following section that back-traces leadership fears through the specific coup-proofing 
methods implemented during the aftermath of the attempt.  
 Morocco (1972) Iraq (1963) Iran (1980) 
Technological Factors    
Firepower/Personnel 
Ratio 
High Reliance Medium Reliance High Reliance 
High-Mobility Medium Reliance High Reliance High Reliance 
Immunity to ground 
forces 
High Reliance High Reliance Low Reliance 
Human Factors    
Resistant to Stacking N/A High Reliance  
Foreign Training  Low Reliance  
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Resistant to discipline High Reliance Low Reliance  
 
 
The coups described in these three cases give specific insights into the applicability of 
this thesis’ framework regarding regime fears of the air force. However, the attempts 
themselves are insufficient to explain the reliance of coup plotters on the human 
characteristics identified in the framework. This following section examines variations in 
coup-proofing methods following coup attempts to more thoroughly investigate the human 
characteristics relied upon in those attempts. This section will analyze coup-proofing methods 
instituted by the Moroccan, Iraqi, and Iranian Air Forces in response to their experience with 
air force involvement in coup attempts.  
 
Moroccan Air Force Coup-Proofing measures 
 Following the 1972 air force decapitation style coup attempt on the royal 747, the 
monarchy instituted strict controls with devastating effects on combat effectiveness. The 
aftermath of the coup attempts resulted in a reorganization of the armed forces and the 
elimination of the both the occupant and the role of the Minister of Defense. Since 1972 the 
Moroccan armed forces has been accountable directly to the King himself.128 The immediate 
reaction to the coup attempt was the purge of “over 200 airmen”129 that grounded three-
quarters of Moroccan combat aircraft. Training programs in the 1970s produced a mere ten 
marginally qualified pilots with “basic flight and technical skills” per annum.130 Thus, the 
effects of the purge were felt, particularly in the upper ranks of the air force, for many years 
following the coup with drastic impacts on combat effectiveness. One example of the 
increased restrictions that accompanied the purge, is the direct control of 1972-1980 all air 
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forces in Morocco by Rabat rather than regional commanders which greatly decreased their 
effectiveness against the Polisario insurgency in Western Sahara.131 Demonstrating the 
natural resistance of air forces to discipline and purges, when the Polisario won a string of 
victories in 1980 these controls over the air force were lifted to boost battlefield 
effectiveness. General Dlimi was placed in direct command of air and land forces in the 
Western Saharah conflict and centralized control was relaxed resulting in “more effective 
Moroccan initiatives....[and] by late 1980 Morocco was in the best position militarily that it 
had been in a long time.”132  
Other methods of immediate control included the distribution of patronage among the 
military as well as the conscription of Arab citizens into the armed forces to dilute the 
influence of the Berber officer corps.133 Yet, the impacts of the the monarchy’s fear of the air 
force extend far beyond the short to medium term personnel difficulties. “The air force came 
to be viewed with suspicion and was continually deprived of major funds for decades.”134 
The expenditure of $240 million to construct an integrated air defense center at Sale 
represents an attempt at modernization limited by tight controls that negate any significant 
gains in combat effectiveness.  
“The center is a paradox. It is a very expensive and modern facility that is being 
used at much less than its full capability... Morocco’s command and control 
network functions under definite limitations. For instance, the only time the 
command center could really operate as a command center would be if Kabbej or 
King Hassan were on the scene ready to conduct operations. Independent action 
by the officers routinely running the Sale facility is unlikely. Furthermore, the 
controllers at the center are prohibited from communicating directly with fighter 
bases - they speak only to airborne aircraft. This restriction undoubtedly reflects 
King Hassan’s lingering fear of what an effective air defense system could 
accomplish if guided by a potential usurper.”135  
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It was not until 1999 that significant expenditures were made to modernize the Moroccan air 
fleet through upgrades to existing F-5 and Mirage F1 aircraft as well as the purchase of new 
fighter jets.136  
“The king appears to understand that one part of his bargain with the FAR 
[Forces Armees Royales] is to keep them equipped with modern arms. The 
Moroccan Air Force is getting two significant modernization packages, one an 
upgrade of its Mirage F1s, along with the projected purchase of the ultra-
modern French “Rafale” fighter.... The question arises as to why Morocco 
needs such advanced fighters.”137 
 
Although the Moroccan Air Force eventually chose to purchase F-16s from the United 
States over the French Rafale, the expenditure of billions of dollars to increase 
professionalism and bolster military as an apolitical organ through arms purchases 
demonstrates the to which the monarchy views the air force as a potential threat. 
“Mohamed VI has not released the controls placed on the military by his father... there 
is still no ministry of national defense or general staff, and the military does not have a 
formal role in economic development or nation-building.”138  
 
Iraqi Air Force Coup-Proofing measures 
 In the decades following the Iraqi coup of 1963, there remained intrusive and 
expensive coup-proofing measures directed squarely at ensuring the loyalty of the Iraqi Air 
Force to the Ba’athist regime under Saddam.139 Principle coup-proofing measures in the Iraqi 
Air Force were the centralization of command and control and tight political controls over air 
combat operations.140 Political controls include strict limitations on the personal autonomy of 
pilots who “follow flight profiles that prevent them from accomplishing their mission rather 
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than deviate from them and face punishment on their return.”141 Leadership are not chosen 
for their skill but their willingness to defer to “the regime’s handling of air operations.”142 
Fears of foreign training and influence are mitigated through the use of a wide array of 
domestic and foreign trainers from “the Soviet Union, France, India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh.”143 This results in poor quality training due to differing flight standards between 
the schools, the lack of Arabic fluent instructors, and no connection between flight school 
tactics and those ordered to be performed in combat squadrons.144 In addition, once the pilots 
returned to Iraq they were kept segregated to prevent the spread of undesirable ideologies145. 
In particular, the dangers of French flight schools which “encouraged pilot 
initiative”146deemed dangerous to the regime. Finally, senior officers and pilots are given 
large sums of cash and land in return for their loyalty despite poor performance on the 
battlefield in the Iran-Iraq war.147 
Utilizing a variety of foreign trainers minimizes the influence of any one state, yet has 
significant negative impacts on combat effectiveness. Similarly, the risk posed by the 
firepower to personnel ratio of an air force is managed through the strict oversight, political 
training, and lack of personal autonomy given to individual pilots. While effective in 
minimizing the individual threat of any one aircraft “these methods often lead to poor 
results”148 and “many Iraqi pilots use these controls as an excuse for not doing their job 
properly.”149 This makes even these mild restrictions highly costly in terms of combat 
effectiveness. They were also unable to prevent repeated coup attempts from within the air 
force. “In the spring of 1982, the entire air force was grounded for ‘plots against the regime.’ 
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In September of 1983, the senior leadership of the air force was summarily shot for an 
attempted coup.”150 The Iraqi Air Force was finally dispersed across the country, kept far 
from the capital, and large aircraft formations were prohibited from flying with armaments to 
minimize their risk to the regime.151 By the mid 1980s, the “Iraqi Air Force was ‘organized 
and deployed to prevent its use in a coup. That is, it was fragmented and enmeshed in 
security procedures that limited is contributions to the war effort.”152 Once the effectiveness 
of the air force in a coup attempt was proven by the Ba’athists, themselves, the Iraqi Air 
Force would remain for decades “the most rebellious of Hussein’s military services.”153 
Iranian Air Force Coup-Proofing measures 
Due to its rapid failure, any analysis of the Iranian coup attempt of 1980 would be incomplete 
without a detailed account of the aftermath and imposition of coup-proofing measures 
imposed to prevent a repeat of the July 10th plot. In the days following the attempt, the 
Iranian Air Force was grounded, 144 accused participants were summarily executed, and an 
attempt was made to assassinate the former Prime Minister of Iran, Shapour Bakhtiar, in 
Paris.154 It appears that there were plans for further purges and 2-4,000 members of the armed 
forces had been dismissed when the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980.155 Of the 
upper echelons of the air force, as many as 85 percent of full colonels and generals were 
retired, jailed, exiled, or executed with disastrous effects on combat effectiveness.156 
Komitehs, or committees of low ranking air force personnel, were empowered to select 
officers and even make command decisions through voting.157  
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However, these coup-proofing measures proved so detrimental to operations that, at 
the start of the Iran-Iraq war, many “purged professionals and retirees returned to active duty, 
most apparently motivated by patriotism.”158 This decision to reinstate purged officers speaks 
directly to the resistance of the air force to purges due to the, in the short term, irreplaceable 
skillset they represent. The Army and Navy was placed under strict clerical control prior to 
1980, yet the same levels of control were not established in the air force until April 1982.159 
Additionally, CIA intelligence assessments from 1984 concluded that, despite the imposition 
of these controls in 1982, the “clerical regime distrusts the air force more than the Army or 
Navy, in part because it was the Shah’s favorite service and because most pilots are well 
educated, US-trained, and have middle- or upper-class backgrounds.”160 The regime was 
fundamentally unable to recruit from its base of support in clerics and rural segments of the 
population due to the technological intensity of occupations in the air force.161 Foreign 
training was seen as crippling to the ability of the regime to trust the loyalty of pilots if 
ordered to engage with US forces and “the air force ha[d] carefully selected four to six 
politically reliable pilots to fly against US forces, suggesting that there are few professionally 
trained pilots who can be trusted in a clash with US forces.162  
Given the limited success of other methods of political controls, air force officers 
were given land, cash, fuel, and low-cost housing to buy their loyalty.163 By 1984, the 
majority of scarce consumer goods available in Iran were diverted to the air force rather than 
the elite Revolutionary Guard.164 Yet, despite these efforts, most pilots oppose the regime and 
key logistical personnel were “retained against their will because they cannot be replaced.”165 
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This has resulted in poor performance as well as acts of sabotage and extensive damage to 
aircraft.166 Above and beyond these acts of disloyalty, pilots allegedly continued in their 
repeated attempts to “bomb Ayatollah Khomeini’s home”167 in June 1981 and May 1983.  
Coup-proofing in the Iranian Air Force was extensive and minimized the threat of air 
force supported coups at an incredible cost in battlefield effectiveness. In the midst of a war 
with Iraq, “the Iranian Air Force’s reduced combat capability, in our judgment, has been a 
key factor in allowing the Iraqis to regain the initiative in the war. The air force is incapable 
of preventing Iraqi attacks on ships or population centers.”168 Yet despite the ability of these 
measures to limit the technological threats posed by a disloyal air force, the Iranian case 
additionally demonstrates the impact of the harder to quantify human characteristics inherent 
to the air force. The Iranian Air Force was highly resistant to purges and political controls 
when compared to the Army and Navy, while the the clerical regime was unable to stack the 
officer corps with members of the clerical elite169. Finally, the role of US-training was 
directly referenced by contemporary intelligence assessments as a key driver behind the 
clerical regimes distrust of the air force more than the other branches of the Iranian armed 
forces.170This section, and its detailed analysis of long term coup-proofing trends, has 
managed to fill in a number of the theoretical gaps left by the initial analysis of the coup 
attempts themselves. Follow up coup attempts, despite repeated purges, demonstrate the 
resistance of the Iraqi and Iranian Air Force’s to political discipline. Additionally, 
modifications or controls on foreign training of pilots indicate support for the second human 
characteristic in this paper’s framework. Finally, long term difficulties in ensuring pilot 
loyalty in all three cases demonstrate the inability to employ the most common, and possibly 
the most effective, form of coup-proofing; ethnic, class, or religious stacking.  
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Conclusion 
The first contention of this thesis, that air forces do play a role in the conduct of a 
coup d’état, has been demonstrated by the key role of the air force in all three of the case 
studies. The implicit, and sometimes explicit, assumption in the literature is that air force 
involvement in a coup is “a rather extreme way to play the game.”171 Yet, due to extensive 
coup-proofing in the late 20th century, most nations have effectively pre-empted the “easy” 
methods through which the military is accustomed to seizing power. Ground forces are 
disbursed far from the capital, countered by regime elite units, and overseen by extensive and 
powerful intelligence organizations. Coups, once extremely common in Latin America and 
the MENA region, are a relative rarity. Yet, Turkish air force coup attempt of 2016 led to 
Foreign Policy running an article entitled “Coup thoughts and questions: Has an air force 
officer ever led a successful one?”172. For the first time in half a century, the literature is 
questioning its offhand dismissal of air forces and their role in the conduct of the coup d’état. 
The three cases used in this thesis demonstrate the size of the theoretical gulf between 
the existing literature and the reality of leadership fears of their air forces. Yet, not only did 
these states fear their air force, in direct contradiction to the advice of the theoretical 
literature, they uniformly feared their air force above the other branches of the armed forces. 
In two of the three cases, Iraq and Iran, their air forces continued to attempt coups despite 
their failure, repeated purges, and the imposition extreme political controls. In Iran, there 
were three air force coup attempts/plots between 1980 and 1983 while Iraq experienced three 
air force coups in 1963 alone in addition to others in 1955 and 1976. These are not an isolated 
trend only present in the three cases used as cases in this thesis. Other examples in the Middle 
east include plots/attempts in Saudi Arabia (1969, 1972, and 1977)173, Afghanistan (1990)174, 
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and Turkey (2016)175. Cases of air force involvement in coups in other regions include coups 
in El Salvador (1944)176, Guatemala (1954177 and 1989178), Thailand (1951)179, Vietnam 
(1975)180, and Argentina (1955181, 1963182, 1976183). These examples are not intended by any 
means to constitute an exhaustive listing of all air force coups, but to demonstrate the 
temporal and geographic variation present in air force coups.184  
Yet, despite the evidence to the contrary, the literature’s dismissal of air forces was 
based on a bias in the civil-military relations literature itself. Their dismissal is fundamentally 
rooted in the almost universal failure of air force coup attempts. However, by considering the 
ability of the air force to participate in the conduct of a coup in a single dimension, success 
and failure, the literature misses the vital distinction between capacity to attempt a coup, 
propensity to attempt a coup, and capacity to succeed in their endeavour. This tripart analysis 
is then utilized to examine the innate technological and human characteristics inherent to the 
air force as a branch of the Armed Forces. It is then utilized to construct a plausible 
theoretical framework that evaluates the coup risks posed by an air force. 
The framework laid out in this work is not limited by any notion of cultural factors 
that would limit its applicability to regions outside of MENA. Instead, this work has focused 
on structural characteristics fundamentally inherent to the air force itself rendering the 
framework universally applicable. Each of the six characteristics presented in the framework 
was tracked through each of the cases and assessed in light of both the coup attempt itself and 
the specific nature of coup-proofing measures enacted in the aftermath. The specific 
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characteristics targeted by leadership through coup-proofing measures are used as a proxy for 
leadership fears specific to the air force as a branch. Intelligence assessments and coup 
plotters reliance on different characteristics of air power complete the analysis and show 
strong support for the framework proposed in this thesis.  
Finally, the theoretical framework contends that the vulnerability of a state to an air 
force coup is structural. The air force is uniquely capable of “decapitation” coups that pose an 
existential threat to personalist regimes that rely on the personal attributes of a single leader. 
The sudden loss of authority in a monarchical or personalist dictatorship creates a power 
vacuum that the military is, perhaps, uniquely capable of filling. In most other systems, the 
decapitation of the head of state is unlikely to signal the demise of the government as a 
whole. The fact that air force coup risk is a structural vulnerability of the state makes 
leadership fears of the air force constant and extremely difficult to assuage. This is 
demonstrated through the long term imposition of crippling restrictions for decades following 
the coup attempts in Morocco (1972-1999) and Iraq (1963-2003).  
In summation Air forces can, and frequently do, play a significant role in the conduct 
of the coup d’état. Their technological characteristics make them inherently threatening, 
while their innate human characteristics make them relatively prone to disloyalty. These 
characteristics create leadership fears that are very difficult to assuage through all but the 
most draconian of coup-proofing measures which, in turn, foster resentment from otherwise 
loyal professional technicians, officers, and pilots in the air force. As demonstrated in the 
Turkish coup attempt in 2016, the era of air force coups has not passed and the paradox of 
coup-proofing the air force remains unsolved. 
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 Morocco (1972) Iraq (1963) Iran (1980) 
Technological Factors    
Firepower/Personnel 
Ratio 
High Reliance Medium Reliance High Reliance 
High-Mobility Medium Reliance High Reliance High Reliance 
Immunity to ground 
forces 
High Reliance High Reliance Low Reliance 
Human Factors    
Resistant to Stacking N/A High Reliance High Reliance 
Foreign Training Low Reliance Medium Reliance High Reliance 
Resistant to discipline High Reliance High Reliance High Reliance 
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